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THE PENDULUM HAS BEEN PUSHED TOO FAR
Don Stuart’
I support Bill C-49V efforts to make our Criminal Code2 reflect the “no means 
no” philosophy and also to criminalize unreasonable behaviour in the sexual 
context. However, I believe that the pendulum has been pushed too far in parts 
of the “rape shield” protection and also in the way that negligent conduct has been 
criminalized in the same category as deliberate conduct. In these two areas the 
law is unjust and potentially unconstitutional.
The immediate impetus for Bill C-49 came from the majority decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Seaboyer.3 The Court struck down the blanket 
exclusion by the Criminal Code of evidence of prior sexual history of a 
complainant, subject to three specified exceptions, on the basis that it violated the 
accused’s right to make full answer and defence under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.4 The decision produced an immediate outcry on the basis 
that women and children would be even less likely to pursue charges of sexual 
assault given that there would be unrestricted cross-examination of their prior 
sexual history. Such comments were quite unfair to the majority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada. Justice McLachlin, for the majority, had been quite alive to the 
dangers of leaving this crucial issue to unfettered judicial discretion and had 
crafted what she considered to be careful guidelines concerning the admissibility 
of such evidence. She has also extended the protection to such conduct with the 
accused. One of the reasons for the vehement reaction was that the majority took 
but a line to hold that, although victims might have equality rights, these had to 
give way to the accused’s right to make full answer and defence.
The response from the then Minister of Justice, the Hon. Kim Campbell, was 
swift. She announced that Parliament would respond to protect women and 
children better. She called a meeting of regional and national women’s groups and 
thereafter worked very closely with them in drafting and revising a Bill.5 The
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coalition of some 60 women’s groups reached unanimity at each point and agreed 
to oppose any attempt to water down the Bill. In this sense, the process was 
partisan. Voices of men, no doubt for the first time in the history of Canadian 
criminal law, were given very little weight.
Since Bill C-49 largely codifies the Seaboyer guidelines, it is ironic that it was 
so enthusiastically received by women’s groups and politicians of every stripe. In 
an effort to reflect equality concerns for victims, s. 276(3) of the new statutory 
scheme declares that the trial judge must consider the interests of the victim on 
the same level as the accused’s right to make full answer and defence. This 
attempts to influence the Supreme Court of Canada to change its earlier 
assessment of the proper balance. Nevertheless, s. 276(3) (h) gives judges even 
more discretion than they had under the old system in declaring that the judge can 
take into account “any other factor” that he or she “considers relevant.” Bill C- 
49, like Seaboyer, declares that evidence of the complainant’s sexual history should 
rarely be admitted, and that the same should apply to prior sexual history with the 
accused.
Prior Sexual History
Given that the accepted test of relevance in our law is a very low threshold test of 
whether the proposition in issue will become more likely because of the evidence,6 
evidence of prior sexual history of the complainant is normally relevant. I hasten 
to add, however, that for reasons given by both the majority and minority in 
Seaboyer, such evidence should indeed rarely be admitted. The myths and 
stereotypes surrounding such evidence will usually mean that the probative force 
will be substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect on the fact-finding process 
(remembering, of course, that prejudice here does not just mean prejudice to the 
interests of the accused, but includes prejudice to the complainant). In the case 
of evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual history with persons other than the 
accused, Seaboyer and Bill C-49 get the result about right. However, I share the 
concerns of my colleague, R J. Delisle,7 about the artificial restrictions on the uses 
to which such evidence can be put in cases where it is admissible, and also on its 
applicability to evidence of prior sexual history with the accused. Most writers, and 
rape shield provisions in other jurisdictions, recognize that the prior sexual history 
of the complainant with the accused should be treated quite differently. The risk 
of myths and stereotypes is far reduced when the issue is not whether somebody 
is trying to drag in prior sexual history to show that an “unchaste” woman is not 
to be believed or is more likely to have consented. In the case of prior sexual
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history with the accused, when the man says the complainant consented and she 
says she did not, or where he says that he acted reasonably and she says he did 
not, it is surely part of the relevant context and essentially fair to admit evidence 
of the type of relationship they had. Of course, the admission of such evidence 
would not be determinative. Everybody should recognize that a woman has the 
right to say “no” even if she has said “yes” to this particular man before. One can 
then predict that the exclusion of evidence of prior consensual sexual conduct 
between the complainant and the accused will, in an appropriate case, lead to a 
successful Charter challenge to this aspect of Bill C-49.
Those who believe that the issue of the admissibility of evidence concerning 
the complainant’s prior sexual history has been satisfactorily resolved by Bill C-49 
may wish to confront concerns recently well expressed by Susan Estrich.8 
Professor Estrich starts by recognizing a new orthodoxy in her classes:
I know many students, and even a few professors, who believe that the women are 
always right and the men are always wrong; that if she didn’t consent fully and 
voluntarily, it is rape, no matter what she said or did, or what he did or did not 
realize. Everything about his past should be admitted, and nothing about hers.
And that’s what they want to hear in class.9
To Professor Estrich, this orthodoxy misses the point given the reality of ongoing 
debates about when women should be believed, what counts as consent, and what 
is reasonable when it comes to sex. She suggests that it is the criminalization of 
acquaintance, rape that presents the most difficulty, not because we do not know 
what constitutes rape, but because we need to know about both the victim and the 
defendant in order to decide who is telling the truth. She puts the question as 
follows:
Assume for a moment, I tell my students, that it was you, or your brother, or your 
boyfriend or your son, who was accused of rape by a casual date with a history of 
psychiatric problems, or by a woman he met in a bar who had a history of one- 
night stands. Would you exclude that evidence? What else can the man do to 
avoid a felony conviction and a ruined life? Where do you draw the line? But if 
you don’t exclude the evidence, will some women as a result become unrapable, 
at least as a matter of law? That is, will women who have histories of mental 
instability or of “promiscuity” ever be able to convince juries who know those 
histories that they really were raped?10




Bill C-49 also enacts a new consent provision under s. 273.1 applicable only to 
charges of sexual assault. The section aims to give courts better guidance 
regarding situations in which consent can be held to have not been genuine and 
therefore not consent in law. The provisions seem adequately drafted and a 
welcome assertion of the “no means no” philosophy. With the exception of s. 
273.1(2) (c), (stating that there is no consent when it is induced by an abuse of 
trust, power or authority, which will require judicial interpretation), the provisions 
appear to merely restate common law principles which confirm that there must be 
true, actual consent by the complainant. “Consent” is rather enigmatically defined 
as the “voluntary agreement of the complainant.” Judges may well derive more 
assistance from s. 273.1(2)(d), which declares that there is no consent where the 
complainant “expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the 
activity.” This subsection clearly preserves the existing common law that consent 
can be express or implied. The women’s coalition had suggested that consent be 
limited to unequivocal communications, but this was rejected. It would have surely 
produced unfairness to the accused. Given the wording of s. 273.1, there is no 
validity in the extravagant claims that in the future written consent will be needed 
in advance for any sexual conduct, that the onus of proof is reversed, or that it has 
criminalized seduction..
Mistaken Belief
While Bill C-49 does not remove a mistaken belief in consent defence to a charge 
of sexual assault, it substantially restricts it. Under s. 273.2, belief in consent is not 
a defence to any sexual assault charge where:
(a) the accused’s belief arose from the accused’s
(i) self-induced intoxication, or
(ii) recklessness or wilful blindness; or
(b) the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the
accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting.
The most significant change is the declaration in s. 273.2(b) that the accused 
will not have a mistaken belief defence where he did not take reasonable steps in 
the circumstances known to him to ascertain whether the complainant was 
consenting. This expressly reverses the substantive ruling in R. v. Pappajohn11 
that an honest belief in consent will excuse even if it was unreasonable. At the 
first reading stage of Bill C-49, the accused was to be required to take “all” 
reasonable steps. The “all” was dropped at the third reading. The Minister of 
Justice accepted arguments that the standard was too severe and risked a Charter
n(1980), 14 C.R. (3d) 243 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Pappajohn].
challenge in that it restricted the minimum Charter standard of due diligence. Bill 
C-49 does not, however, affect the further evidentiary ruling in Pappajohn (which 
was later reflected in s. 265(4) of the Criminal Code), that in order to succeed, the 
defence must have an “air of reality” in the sense that it must be based on 
evidence other than the accused’s own testimony. That special rule has accounted 
for the fact that the mistaken belief in consent defence is rarely put to a jury. 
Since Pappajohn was decided, there have been only a few acquittals based on a 
mistaken belief in consent defence and only one decision in which a Court of 
Appeal has confirmed such an acquittal.12
My complaint against s. 273.2 is not that Parliament has now resorted to an 
objective standard for sexual assault. It was time for Parliament to declare 
criminal responsibility for objectively unreasonable sexual behaviour, because such 
behaviour is sufficiently culpable. It is also consistent with the acceptance of the 
objective standard in cases of other crimes, such as manslaughter, dangerous 
driving and criminal negligence offences. However, whenever resort is had to an 
objective standard, it should be recognized that this is an external standard and 
considerably extends the reach of the criminal law. Few judges or writers continue 
to insist that criminal responsibility always be based on a determination of 
subjective fault in the sense that the accused was actually aware of the prohibited 
risk. However, most still point to an important distinction in culpability between 
a deliberate risk-taker and one who is unreasonable in that he did not anticipate 
the risk, but ought to have. Surely there is a qualitative distinction between a mem 
who deliberately rapes a woman knowing that she is not consenting, and one who 
engages in sexual intercourse where it was, in the circumstances, unreasonable for 
him to have understood that the woman was consenting. These different forms 
of culpability should be reflected in different forms of conviction and different 
penalties. This is how the Supreme Court, in its Charter ruling striking down 
constructive murder rules,13 has distinguished between murder and manslaughter. 
Parliament, too, has previously moved cautiously in its efforts to create some 
criminality based on the objective standard. When it created an offence of arson 
by negligence in 1990, the new s. 436 of the Criminal Code specifically declared 
that the offence required proof of a marked departure from the standard of care 
that a reasonably prudent person would use, and reduced the penalty from a 
maximum of fourteen years in the normal arson case to one of five years 
imprisonment.
Section 273.2 is also too inflexible on the issue of self-induced intoxication. 
Given the nature of sexual activity, a man would have to be very drunk indeed 
before the trier of fact would accept that, because of his intoxication, he could not
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have been able to determine whether the alleged victim was consenting. A 
drunken rapist is usually also a deliberate rapist. But if the accused was very 
drunk, there might be rare cases where he could not be said to have known what 
he was doing. In such cases, a trier of fact might well wish to base culpability on 
a failure to measure up to the reasonable standard. However, s. 273.2(a) (i) 
precludes any such determination.
This writer presented a brief to both the House of Commons and the Senate 
Committees, suggesting that Bill C-49 be amended to create a separate new crime 
of negligent sexual assault with a lesser penalty of a maximum of five years 
imprisonment. The scheme would have had the advantage that the determination 
of culpability would be made by the trier of fact. This arrangement of criminal 
responsibility would also have had strategic advantages. Accused persons may well 
have been more likely to plead guilty to a lesser offence, thus sparing victims from 
having to testify. Given current sentencing patterns, a five year maximum seemed 
to offer adequate scope for punishment of a negligent offender for reasons of 
individual and general deterrence and retribution. Of course, the Crown Attorney 
would not have any obligation to accept a plea to the lesser offence. The response 
of the Minister, provided only at the last moment in the brief Senate Committee 
hearing, was that this was a matter that could be left to sentencing discretion. In 
my judgment, it is fundamental that the key determination of culpability as to 
whether an actor is deliberate or negligent should be made at trial, and not be left 
to the uncertain exercise of sentencing. A person charged with sexual assault is 
entitled to know whether the conviction is based on his or her having been 
deliberate or merely negligent. Since the matter has been left to sentencing, one 
can only hope that judges will be careful to provide adequate reasons so that a 
clear jurisprudence can be developed as to the importance of the type of 
culpability. In the case of jury trials, where the trial judge cannot know the factual 
basis for a jury conviction, the judge will have to embark on a separate inquiry as 
to the basis of culpability before sentencing.
Charter challenges based on the Supreme Court of Canada’s assertion of a 
constitutional requirement of fault pursuant to the guarantee of principles of 
fundamental justice under s. 7 now seem far less likely to succeed against Bill C- 
49. In R. v. DeSousa,14 a unanimous judgment of five justices held that while s. 
7 still guards against absolute liability, absent very high stigma, any federal or 
provincial offence will be constitutional if it has a subjective or objective fault 
requirement. The Court further held, in obiter, that the fault need not relate to 
all the essential ingredients of the crime.
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Despite DeSousa, there would appear to be at least four possible Charter 
challenges to Bill C-49’s substantive regime. I have detailed these elsewhere15 
and will, here, merely provide the basic framework of the arguments:
1. The air of reality test violates the accused’s right to make full answer and 
defence.
The requirement that the mistaken belief in consent defence be grounded on 
evidence other than the accused’s testimony sets up an unfair corroboration rule. 
In the case of any other defence all the accused has to do is to point to an 
evidential base and can use any source of evidence to do so. The regime of Bill 
C-49 may make the special air of reality rule operate especially unfairly. Under 
s. 276.2(2) the complainant is not compellable at an admissibility hearing 
respecting evidence of prior sexual history. She may well not testify. Without such 
testimony, it may be impossible for the accused to point to independent evidence. 
Rather than striking down s. 276.2(2), the solution may be to modify the special 
judge-made rule.
2. Section 273.2’s exclusion of any intoxication defence imposes absolute liability 
which threatens the liberty interest.
This argument would necessitate the Supreme Court re-visiting its complex, 
split decision in R. v. Bernard,16 which found that denying a defence of voluntary 
intoxication to a general intent crime like sexual assault does not violate the 
Charter. However Bernard can also be read as a 5-2 holding that extreme 
intoxication is a defence to any crime, including sexual assault.
3. Sexual assault is one of those few offences requiring a minimum degree of 
mens rea in the form of subjective foresight.
The Supreme Court has thus far identified only a few offences (such as 
murder, attempted murder and theft) for the special requirement of subjective 
foresight and has placed considerable emphasis on the special nature of the stigma 
attached and the penalties. Although the criterion of stigma has often been 
criticized as an inadequate and unreliable test, it still seems to be a discriminating 
factor. If this is so, surely sexual assault is an offence calling for such special 
treatment?
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4. Section 2732 is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional 
principle that those causing harm intentionally must be punished more 
severely than those causing harm unintentionally.
In Martineau, Justice Lamer (as he then was) rested the Supreme Court’s 
ruling that there is a constitutional requirement of subjective foresight of death for 
murder in part on the principle that punishment must be proportional to the moral 
blameworthiness of the offender, and also on the principle that those causing harm 
intentionally must be punished more severely than those causing harm 
unintentionally. These principles, which were not referred to in DeSousa, appear 
sound and should be boldly asserted by all judges. If the Martineau principles have 
any remaining vitality the new sexual assault scheme, which clearly criminalized in 
the same prohibition someone who was deliberately aware of a risk and one who 
was acting merely unreasonably, should be struck down or at least read down.
Conclusion
In its understandable concern to better reflect the interests of sexual assault 
victims in criminal trials, Parliament has gone too far respecting parts of the rape 
shield protection and the manner in which it has criminalized unreasonable 
behaviour. It remains to be seen whether an independent judiciary, free of 
considerations of political expediency, will adjust the pendulum to ensure that 
trials are fair.
